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We analyze the distributional and efficiency impacts of different allowance allocation schemes for
a national cap and trade system using the USREP model, a new recursive dynamic computable general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. We consider allocation schemes applied to a comprehensive
national cap and trade system that limits cumulative greenhouse gas emissions over the control period
to 203 billion metric tons. The policy target approximates national goals identified in pending legislation.
We find that the allocation schemes in all proposals are progressive over the lower half of the income
distribution and proportional in the upper half of the income distribution. We also find that carbon
pricing by itself (ignoring the return of carbon revenues through allowance allocations) is proportional
to modestly progressive. This striking result follows from the dominance of the sources over uses side
impacts of the policy and stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has focused only on the uses
side. Lower income households derive a large fraction of income from government transfers and, reflecting
the reality that these are generally indexed to inflation, we hold the transfers constant in real terms.
As a result this source of income is unaffected by carbon pricing, while wage and capital income is
affected.
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U.S.  Senate  proposals  for  cap  and  trade  legislation  and  the  House-passed 
Waxman Markey Bill focus on similar overall cuts in greenhouse gases.  The 
biggest difference among them is how allowances, and the revenue from their 
auction, would be distributed.  Different uses of revenue or different allowance 
allocations  would  not  in  the  first  instance  affect  the  direct  cost  of  achieving 
emissions reductions but they can have important implications for how costs are 
borne  by  different  regions  and  among  households  of  different  income  levels.  
Different uses of revenue may have indirect effects on the overall welfare cost of 
a  policy  to  the  extent  revenue  is  used  to  offset  other  distortionary  taxes.  In 
addition  the  allowance  allocation  has  efficiency  impacts  to  the  extent  that  it 
creates further distortions or prevents pass through of the full CO2 price in some 
products, or is used in some way that does not create value for U.S. citizens.  
Rausch et al. (2009) investigated some generic allocation schemes with a multi-
region, multi-household static general equilibrium model of the U.S., the U.S. 
Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model. Here we extend the USREP model to a 
recursive  dynamic  formulation  and  design  allocation  schemes  intended  to 
approximate more closely specific cap and trade proposals. 
In extending the USREP model to a recursive dynamic formulation we borrow 
the  dynamic  structure  of  the  MIT  Emissions  Prediction  and  Policy  Analysis 
(EPPA) model (Paltsev et  al. (2005)).  With this  extension  we are able more 
closely to represent features of revenue use and allowance allocation in specific 
legislative  proposals  and  contrast  their  distributional  implications.  As  with 
previous analyses of greenhouse gas legislation conducted with the EPPA model 
such as that in Paltsev et al. (2009) we attempt to capture key features of the cap 
and  trade  provisions  in  the  proposals  but  are  not  able  to  address  many  other 
provisions of the bills that deal with energy efficiency standards and the like.  The 
added  value  here  is  that  we  can  consider  distributional  effects  of  proposed 
legislation.    We  contrast  the  allowance  allocation  schemes  of  the  House 
legislation (Waxman-Markey) with those of the Senate proposals of Kerry and 
Boxer and of Cantwell and Collins. As a result of negotiations in the Senate the 
Kerry-Boxer bill has stalled and been replaced by a discussion draft by Senators 
Kerry and Lieberman. The bill contains a variety of new features but is similar to 
Waxman-Markey in its allocation of allowance value. To isolate the effects of 
different allocation schemes, we formulate a cap and trade policy designed to 
limit cumulative emissions over the control period in all scenarios to 203 billion 
metric tons (bmt). The cap and trade provisions of the  proposals we consider 
would lead to somewhat different cumulative emissions because of differences in 
the  timing  of  reductions,  sectoral  coverage,  and  whether  outside  credits  were 
allowed.  2 
 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer are part auction, part free allocation with a 
complex allowance and revenue allocation designed to achieve many different 
purposes. In contrast, Cantwell and Collins proposal auctions all allowances and 
distributes most of the revenue with a very straightforward lump sum allocation to 
individuals.    Extending  our  analysis  to  distributional  issues  requires  further 
interpretation, especially for those proposals with complex allocation schemes, of 
how allocation of allowances and auction revenue would actually occur if current 
proposals were implemented. 
Our  analysis  shows  a  number  of  results.    First,  scenarios  based  on  the 
Waxman-Markey  and  Kerry-Boxer  (or  Kerry-Lieberman)  allowance  allocation 
schemes are more progressive (i.e., a larger welfare loss is imposed on higher 
income households) in early years than scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins 
proposal.  We emphasize, however, that the overall distributional impact of these 
proposals depend on all the proposals contained in these legislative proposals and 
not  just  the  cap  and  trade  programs.    Nonetheless  the  allowance  allocation 
schemes are important determinants of the overall distributional impact of these 
bills.  Second, scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins allocation proposal have 
lower welfare costs due to lower redistribution to low income households and 
consequent lower income-induced increases in energy demand.  Third, we find 
that  the  Waxman-Markey  and  Kerry-Boxer  (or  Kerry-Lieberman)  allocation 
schemes appear to overcompensate some adversely affected income groups and 
regions early on though this dissipates over time as the allocation scheme evolves 
to something closer to lump sum distribution.  Fourth, the allocation schemes in 
all proposals are progressive over the lower half of the income distribution and 
essentially proportional in the upper half of the income distribution.  Finally we 
find that carbon pricing by itself, ignoring the return of carbon revenues through 
allowance  allocations,  is  proportional  to  modestly  progressive.    We  trace  our 
result  to  the dominance of  the sources  side over the uses side impacts of the 
policy. It stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has focused only on the 
uses  side,  and  has  hence  found  energy  taxation  to  be  regressive.  It  is  worth 
pointing out that our model framework provides only an analysis of welfare costs 
of climate policy and does not attempt to incorporate any benefits from averting 
climate change. Any  welfare changes  reported  in  this  paper therefore  refer to 
changes in costs. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 briefly describes the recursive 
dynamic version of the USREP model. Section 3 provides some background on 
incidence  theory.    Section  4  discusses  the  legislative  proposals  we  evaluate, 
mapping  the  allowance  and  revenue  allocation  in  the  Bills  to  specific 
distributional schemes in the model. Section 5 defines policy scenarios based on 
the  proposed  greenhouse  gas  control  measures.  Section  6  investigates  the 
distributional implications across regions and income classes of allocation  3 
 
Table 1.  USREP Model Details: Regional and Sectoral Breakdown and Primary Input 
Factors. 
Region
a   Sectors   Primary Input Factors  
Alaska (AK)  Non-Energy   Capital  
California (CA)     Agriculture (AGR)   Labor 
Florida (FL)     Services (SRV)   Land  
New York (NY)     Energy-Intensive (EIS)          Crude Oil  
New England (NENGL)     Other Industries (OTH)   Shale Oil  
South East (SEAST)     Transportation (TRN)   Natural Gas  
North East (NEAST)   Energy   Coal  
South Central (SCENT)     Coal (COL)   Nuclear  
Texas (TX)     Convent. Crude Oil (CRU)                                    Hydro  
North Central (NCENT)     Refined Oil (OIL)   Wind  
Mountain (MOUNT)    Natural Gas (GAS)   
Pacific  (PACIF)     Electric: Fossil  (ELE)    
    Electric: Nuclear (NUC)   
    Electric: Hydro (HYD)   
    Advanced Technologies      
 (see Table 3) 
 
aModel regions are aggregations of the following U.S. states: NENGL = Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island; SEAST = Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi; NEAST = West Virginia, Delaware, 
Maryland,  Wisconsin,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  District  of 
Columbia; SCENT = Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana; NCENT =  Missouri, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa; MOUNT = Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, 
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; PACIF = Oregon, Washington, Hawaii. 
 
scenarios reflecting our interpretation of proposed policies, and Section 7 reports 
the  results  of  a  counterfactual  analysis  that  allows  us  to  trace  the  source  of 
distribution effects we observe. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  A  RECURSIVE-DYNAMIC  U.S.  REGIONAL  ENERGY  POLICY 
MODEL 
USREP is a computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy designed 
to analyze energy and greenhouse gas policies.
2 It has the  capability to assess 
impacts  on  regions,  sectors  and  industries,  and  different  household  income 
classes.  As  in  any  classical  Arrow -Debreu  general  equilibrium  model,  our 
                                                 
2  As  in  any  standard  computable  general  equilibrium  model,  our  framework  adopts  a  full-
employment  assumption  and  further  assumes  that  money  is  neutral,  i.e.  production  and 
consumption decisions are solely determined by relative prices. 4 
 
framework combines the behavioral assumption of rational economic agents with 
the  analysis  of  equilibrium  conditions,  and  represents  price-dependent  market 
interactions  as  well  as  the  origination  and  spending  of  income  based  on 
microeconomic  theory.    Profit-maximizing  firms  produce  goods  and  services 
using intermediate inputs from other sectors and primary factors of production 
from  households.    Utility-maximizing  households  receive  income  from 
government transfers and from the supply of factors of production to firms (labor, 
capital, land, and resources). Income thus earned is spent on goods and services or 
is saved. The government collects tax revenue which is spent on consumption and 
household transfers. USREP is a recursive-dynamic model, and hence savings and 
investment decisions are based on current period variables.
3 
  The USREP model is built on stat e-level economic data from the IMPLAN 
dataset  (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008)  covering all transactions among 
businesses, households, and government agents for the base year 2006.     The 
detailed  representation  of  existing  taxes  captures 
effects of tax-base erosion, and comprises sector- and region-specific ad valorem 
output  taxes,  payroll  taxes  and  capital  income  taxes.  IMPLAN  data  has  been 
augmented by incorporating regional tax data from the NBER tax simulator to 
represent marginal personal income tax rates by region and income class. Energy 
data from  the Energy  Information  Administration’s State Energy Data System 
(SEDS) are merged with the economic data to provide physical flows of energy 
for greenhouse gas accounting. Non-CO2 greenhouse gases are based on the EPA 
inventory data, and are included as in the EPPA model with endogenous costing 
of the abatement (Hyman et al., 2003).  
The basic structure and data used in the USREP model are described in some 
detail in Rausch et al. (2009) with the dynamic structure borrowed from EPPA 
(Paltsev et al., 2005).  We focus discussion here on elements of the model that 
differ from that described in these two previous papers and on the data sources 
and calibration needed to regionalize the model. The underlying state level data 
base provides flexibility in the regional detail of the model.  Here we use the 
regional structure shown in Figure 1.  This structure separately identifies larger 
states,  allows  representation  of  separate  electricity  interconnects,  and  captures 
some of the diversity among states in use and production of energy.  Table 1 
provides an overview of the sectoral breakdown and the primary factors of  
                                                 
3 Experience from a forward-looking version of the EPPA model (Babiker et al. (2008)) suggests 
that energy sector and CO2 price behavior are similar to those derived from a recursive-dynamic 
model. Consumption shifting as an additional avenue of adjustment to the policy may, however, 
lower overall policy costs. On the other hand, inter-temporal optimization with perfect foresight 
poorly represents the real economy where agents face high levels of uncertainty that likely lead to 
higher costs than if they knew the future with certainty. We leave for future work the careful 
comparison of how alternative approaches to expectations formation may influence model results. 5 
 
Figure 1. Regional Aggregation in the USREP Model. 
 
production. Consistent with the assumption of perfect competition on product and 
factor markets, production and consumption processes exhibit constant-returns-to-
scale  and  are  modeled  by  nested  constant-elasticity-of-substitution  (CES) 
functions.  A  detailed  description  of  the  nesting  structure  for  each  production 
sector and household consumption is provided in Rausch et al. (2009). 
There  are  nine  representative  households  in  each  region  differentiated  by 
income  levels  as  shown  in  Table  2.    Households  across  income  classes  and 
regions differ in terms of income sources as well as expenditures. State-specific 
projections through 2030 are from the U.S. Census Bureau (2009a).
4 Labor supply 
is determined by the household choice between leisure and labor . We calibrate 
compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities following the approach 
described  in  Ballard  (2000),  and  assume  for  all  income  groups  that  the  
uncompensated (compensated) labor supply elasticity is 0.1 (0.3). L abor is fully 
mobile across industries in a given region but is immobile across U.S. regions. 
  Savings enters directly into the utility function which generates the demand for 
savings and makes the consumption-investment decision endogenous. We follow 
an approach by  Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005) distinguishing between 
capital that is used in production of market goods and services and capital used in 
households (e.g. the housing stock).  We assume income from the former is  
                                                 
4 The USREP model incorporates demographic data on the population and number of households 
in each region and income class for the base year 2006 based on U.S. Census Data (2009b). We 
apply state-specific population growth rates uniformly to all income groups.  
 6 
 
Table 2.  Income Classes Used in the USREP Model and Cumulative Population. 
Income class  Description   Cumulative Population  
for whole U.S. (in %)
a 
hhl  Less than $10,000  7.3 
hh10  $10,000 to $15,000  11.7 
hh15  $15,000 to $25,000  21.2 
hh25  $25,000 to $30,000  31.0 
hh30  $30,000 to $50,000  45.3 
hh50  $50,000 to $75,000  65.2 
hh75  $75,000 to $100,000  78.7 
hh100  $100,000 to $150,000  91.5 
hh150  $150,000 plus  100.0 
aBased on data from U.S. Census Bureau (2009a). 
 
subject to taxation while the imputed income from housing capital is not, and so 
households can shift investment between market and housing capital in response 
to  changing  capital  taxation.  Lacking  specific  data  on  capital  ownership, 
households  are  assumed  to  own  a  pool  of  U.S.  capital—that  is  they  do  not 
disproportionately own capital assets within the region in which they reside. 
  We adopt the vintage capital structure of the EPPA model.  Malleable capital is 
mobile across U.S. regions and industries, while vintaged capital is region and 
industry specific. As a result there is a common rate of return on malleable capital 
across the U.S. The accumulation of both malleable and non-malleable capital is 
calculated as investment net of depreciation according to the standard perpetual 
inventory assumption. Given base year data about investment demand by sector 
and by region, we specify for each region an investment sector that produces an 
aggregate investment good equal to the sum of endogenous savings by different 
household  types.  Foreign  capital  flows  are  fixed  as  in  the  EPPA  model.  We 
assume an integrated U.S. market for fossil fuel resources and that the regional 
ownership of resources is distributed in proportion to capital income.  Rausch et 
al. (2009) explored the implications of assuming instead that resource ownership 
was regional.  Such an assumption amplifies regional differences in the impacts of 
climate legislation, resulting in greater costs for regions with significant energy 
production  but  we  believe  that  assumption  overestimates  regional  differences 
because equity ownership in large energy companies is broadly owned. 
Labor-augmenting technical change is a key driver of economic growth as in 
EPPA.  Regional  labor  productivity  growth  rates  were  calibrated  to  match 
AEO2009  GDP  growth  through  2030.  Beyond  2030,  population  and  labor 
productivity  growth  rates  are  extrapolated  by  fitting  a  logistic  function  that 
assumes convergence in growth rates in 2100. The 2100 targets for annual labor  
 7 
 
Table 3.  Summary of Advanced Technologies in USREP. 
Technology  Description 
Coal Gasification   Converts  coal  into  a  perfect  substitute  for  natural 
gas. 
Shale Oil  Extracts and upgrades shale oil resources  into a 
perfect substitute for oil. 
Biomass Liquids  Converts  biomass  into  a  perfect  substitute  for 
refined oil. 
Biomass Electricity  Converts  biomass  into  a  perfect  substitute  for 
electricity. 
Intermittent Wind and Solar  Converts intermittent wind and solar resources into 
an  imperfect  substitute  for  electricity.  Costs 
increase as wind production increases as a share 
of  total  electricity  production,  representing 
increasing costs of integrating wind into the grid. 
Wind with gas backup  Creates  a  perfect  substitute  for  conventional 
electricity  by  jointly  building  wind  turbines  and 
natural  gas  generation.  The  gas  generation  is 
assumed to operate at a 7% capacity factor—only 
as  a  backup  when  wind  is  not  sufficient  to  meet 
load requirements. 
Wind with biomass backup  Creates  a  perfect  substitute  for  conventional 
electricity  by  jointly  building  wind  and  biomass 
generation.  The biomass generation operates at a 
7% capacity factor—only as a backup when wind is 
not sufficient to meet load requirements. 
Advanced Gas  Based  on  natural  gas  combined  cycle  (NGCC) 
electricity  generation  technology  that  converts 
natural gas into electricity. 
Advanced  Gas  with  Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration 
Natural  gas  combined  cycle  technology  that 
captures  90%  or  more  of  the  CO2  produced  in 
generating electricity. 
Advanced  Coal  with  Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration 
Broadly based on an Integrated coal gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC) plant that captures 90% or 
more of the CO2 produced in generating electricity, 
but can also represent flue gas capture processes. 
Advanced nuclear  Next  generation  of  nuclear  power  plants 
incorporating  estimated  costs  of  building  new 
nuclear power plants in the future. 
 
productivity growth and for annual population growth are two and zero percent, 
respectively. 
Energy supply is regionalized for USREP by incorporating data on regional 
fossil fuel reserves from the U.S. Geological Service and the Department of 8 
 
Energy
5. The resource depletion model and elasticities of substitution between 
resource and non-resource inputs in fossil fuel production are identical to those in 
EPPA. As in EPPA, a range of advanced technologies not widely present in the 
base year data are specified in Table 2.  
The  markups,  share  parameters  and  elasticity  parameters  for  the  advanced 
energy supply technologies are those from Paltsev et al. (2009) and the same cost 
mark-ups  apply  in  all  regions  except  for  renewables.  For  renewables  the  cost 
shares are taken from Paltsev et al. (2009) but regional mark-ups and elasticity 
parameters are derived from regional supply curves. Regional wind supply curves 
for each technology have been estimated based on high-resolution wind data from 
NREL (2009) and a levelized cost model described in Morris (2009) that was also 
the  basis  for  cost  estimates  in  Paltsev  et  al.  (2009).    The  TrueWinds  model 
(NREL, 2009) provides data on the capacity factors for wind turbines if they were 
located at sites across the U.S., allowing construction of a regional wind supply 
curve that depends on the quality of wind resources in each region.  We derive 
regional  supply  curves  for  biomass  from  data  from  Oakridge  National 
Laboratories (2009) that describes quantity and price pairs for biomass supply for 
each state. 
Non-price induced improvements in energy efficiency are represented by an 
Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement (AEEI) parameter as in EPPA, and 
represent  technological  progress  that  reduces  at  no  cost  the  energy  needed  in 
consumption and production activities, thus resulting in reduced energy use per 
unit of activity and general productivity improvement over time.  Reference case 
energy  use  is  calibrated  to  the  updated  AEO2009  reference  case  (Energy 
Information Administration (2009)). The baseline thus includes both the impacts 
of  the  American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment  Act  (ARRA)  and  the  Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA). 
Sectoral  output  produced  in  each  region  is  converted  through  a  constant-
elasticity-of-transformation function into goods destined for the regional, national, 
and  international  market.  All  goods  are  tradable.  Depending  on  the  type  of 
commodity,  we  distinguish  three  different  representations  of  intra-national 
regional trade. First, bilateral flows for all non-energy goods are represented as 
―Armington‖ goods (Armington (1969)), where like goods from other regions are 
imperfectly substitutable for domestically produced goods. Second, domestically 
traded  energy  goods,  except  for  electricity,  are  assumed  to  be  homogeneous 
products, i.e. there is a national pool that demands domestic exports and supplies 
domestic imports. This assumption reflects the high degree of integration of intra-
U.S.  markets  for  natural  gas,  crude  and  refined  oil,  and  coal.    Third,  we 
                                                 
5 Source for crude oil and natural gas reserves: Department of Energy (2009). Source for shale oil 
reserves: John R. Dyni (2006). Source for coal resources: USGS (2009). 9 
 
differentiate  six  regional  electricity  pools  that  are  designed  to  provide  an 
approximation of the existing structure of independent system operators (ISO) and 
the  three  major  NERC  interconnections  in  the  U.S.  More  specifically,  we 
distinguish the Western, Texas ERCOT and the Eastern NERC interconnections 
and  in  addition  identify  AK,  NENGL,  and  NY  as  separate  regional  pools.
6 
7 
Within each regional pool, we assume that traded electricity is a homogenous 
good, where no electricity is traded between regional pools.  
Analogously to the export side, we adopt the Armington (1969) assumption of 
product heterogeneity for imports. A CES function characterizes the trade -off 
between imported, from national and international sources, and locally produced 
varieties of the same goods. Foreign closure of the model is determined through a 
national balance-of-payments (BOP) constraint. 
 
3. BACKGROUND ON DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Carbon pricing through a cap-and-trade system has very similar impacts to broad 
based energy taxes – not surprising since over eighty percent of greenhouse gas 
emissions are associated with the combustion of fossil fuels (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (2009)).  The literature on distributional implications across 
income groups of energy taxes is a long and extensive one and some general 
conclusions  have  been  reached  that  help  inform  the  distributional  analysis  of 
carbon pricing.  First, analyses that rank households by their annual income find 
that excise taxes in general tend to be regressive (e.g. Pechman (1985) looking at 
excise taxes in general and Metcalf (1999) looking specifically at a cluster of 
environmental taxes).   
The  difficulty  with  this  ranking  procedure  is  that  many  households  in  the 
lowest  income  groups  are  not  poor  in  any  traditional  sense  that  should  raise 
welfare  concerns.    This  group  includes  households  that  are  facing  transitory 
negative income shocks or who are making human capital investments that will 
lead to higher incomes later in life (e.g. graduate students).  It also includes many 
retired households which may have little current income but are able to draw on 
extensive savings.   
                                                 
6 We identify NY and NENGL as separate pools since electricity flows with contiguous ISOs 
represent only a small fraction of total electricity generation in those regions. For example, based 
on own calculation from data provided by ISOs, net electricity trade between ISO New England 
and ISO New York account for less than 1% of total electricity produced in ISO New England. 
Interface  flows  between  the  New  York  and  neighboring  ISOs  amount  to  about  6%  of  total 
electricity generation in ISO New York. 
7 The regional electricity pools are thus defined as follows: NENGL, NY, TX, AK each represent 
a separate pool. The Western NERC interconnection comprises CA, MOUNT, and  PACIF. The 
Eastern NERC interconnection comprises NEAST, SEAST, and FL.  10 
 
That current income may not be a good measure of household well being has 
long been known and has led to a number of efforts to measure lifetime income.  
This leads to the second major finding in the literature.  Consumption taxes – 
including  taxes  on  energy  –  look  considerably  less  regressive  when  lifetime 
income measures are used than when annual income measures are used.  Studies 
include  Davies,  St  Hilaire  and  Whalley  (1984),  Poterba  (1989,  (1991),  Bull, 
Hassett and Metcalf (1994), Lyon and Schwab (1995) and many others.
8   
The lifetime income approach is an important caveat to distributional findings 
from  annual  incidence  analyses  but  it  relies  on  strong  assumptions  about 
household consumption decisions.  In particular it assumes that households base 
current consumption decisions knowing their full stream of earnings over their 
lifetime.  While it is reasonable to assume that households have some sense of 
future income, it may be implausible to assume they have complete knowledge or 
that they necessarily base spending decisions on income that may be received far 
in the future.
9  It may be that the truth lies somewhere between annual and 
lifetime  income  analyses.   Moreover,  if  one  were  to  use  a  lifetime  income 
approach, one would like to track consumption over the l ifecycle to capture any 
lifecycle changes in the consumption of carbon intensive products and compare 
lifetime carbon pricing burdens rather than a single -year snapshot.  This paper 
takes a current income approach to sorting households.   
Turning to climate policy in particular a number of papers have attempted to 
measure the distributional impacts of carbon pricing across household income 
groups. Dinan and Rogers (2002) build on Metcalf (1999) to consider how the 
distribution of allowances from a cap and trade program affects the distributional 
outcome.  Both these papers emphasize that focusing on the distributional burden 
of carbon pricing (either a tax or auctioned permits) without regard to the use of 
the  revenue  raised  (or  potentially  raised)  from  carbon  pricing   provides  an 
incomplete distributional analysis.  How the proceeds from carbon pricing are 
distributed have important impacts on the ultimate distributional outcome.   
The point that use of carbon revenues matters for distribution is the  basis for 
the distributional and revenue neutral proposal in Metcalf (2007) for a carbon tax 
swap.  It is also the focus of the analysis in  Burtraw, Sweeney and Walls (2009).  
This latter paper considers five different uses of revenue from a cap and trade 
auction focusing on income distribution as well as regional distribution.  A similar 
                                                 
8 Most of these studies look at a snapshot of taxes in one year relative to some proxy for lifetime 
income  –  often  current  consumption  based  on  the  permanent  income  hypothesis  of  Friedman 
(1957).  An  exception  is  Fullerton  and  Rogers  (1993)  who  model  the  lifetime  pattern  of  tax 
payments as well as income. 
9 On the other hand casual observation of graduate students in professional schools (business, law, 
medicine) make clear that many households are taking future income into account in their current 
consumption decisions. 11 
 
focus  on  income  and  regional  distribution  is  in  Hassett,  Mathur  and  Metcalf 
(2009).  This last paper does not consider the use of revenue but does compare 
both annual and lifetime income measures as well as a regional analysis using 
annual income.  Grainger and Kolstad (2009)  do a similar analysis as that of 
Hassett,  Mathur  and  Metcalf  (2009)  and  note  that  the  use  of  household 
equivalence  scales  can  exacerbate  the  regressivity  of  carbon  pricing.    Finally 
Burtraw,  Walls  and  Blonz  (2009)  consider  the  distributional  impacts  in  an 
expenditure side analysis where they focus on the allocation of permits to local 
distribution companies (LDCs).  Rausch et al. (2009) also investigate the welfare 
costs of allocations to LDCs and find that allocations that lead to real or perceived 
reductions in electricity prices by consumers have large efficiency costs.    
With the exception of the last paper, all of the papers above assume that the 
burden of carbon pricing is shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher 
energy  prices  and  higher  prices  of  energy-intensive  consumption  goods  and 
services.  That carbon pricing is passed forward to consumers follows from the 
analysis of a number of computable general equilibrium models.  Bovenberg and 
Goulder (2001), for example, find that coal prices rise by over 90 percent of a $25 
per ton carbon tax in the short and long run (Table 2.4).
10  This incidence result 
underlies their finding that only a small percentage of permits need be freely 
allocated  to  energy  intensive  industries  to  compensate  shareholders  for  any 
windfall losses from a cap and trade program.  See also  Bovenberg, Goulder and 
Gurney (2005) for more on this issue. 
Metcalf et al. (2008) consider the degree of forward shifting, as a result of 
higher consumer prices and backward shifting, as a result of lower factor returns, 
over different time periods for a carbon tax policy begun in 2012 and slowly 
ramped up through 2050.  The tax on carbon emissions from coal are largely 
passed  forward  to  consumers  in  all  years  of  the  policy  in  roughly  the  same 
magnitude found by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001).  Roughly ten percent of the 
burden of carbon pricing on crude oil is shifted back to oil producers initially with 
the share rising to  roughly one-fourth by 2050 as  consumers are able to  find 
substitutes for oil in the longer run.  Interestingly the consumer burden of the 
carbon tax on natural gas exceeds the tax.  This reflects the sharp rise in demand 
for natural gas as an initial response to carbon pricing is to substitute gas for coal 
in electricity generation.  By 2050 the producer price is falling for reasonably 
stringent carbon policies.
11 
                                                 
10 They assume world pricing for oil and natural gas so that the gross of tax prices for these two 
fossil fuels rise by the full amount of the tax. 
11 Distributional results depend importantly on the stringency of policy.  How stringent the policy 
is affects whether carbon free technologies are adopted in the EPPA model and therefore what the 
relative demand for fossil fuels is.  In the text above we are reporting carbon tax results for a 
policy that limits emissions to 287 billion metric tons over the control period. 12 
 
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) construct an analytic general equilibrium model to 
identify the various key parameters and relationships that determine the ultimate 
burden of a tax on a pollutant.
12   While the model is not sufficiently detailed to 
provide a realistic assessment of climate change impacts on the  U.S. economy it 
illustrates critical parameters and relationships that drive burden results. 
The general equilibrium models discussed above all assume a re presentative 
agent in the U.S. thereby limiting their usefulness to considering distributional 
questions.  Metcalf, et al. (2008) apply results from a representative agent model 
to  data  on  U.S.  households  that  allows  them  to  draw  conclusions  about 
distributional impacts of policies but the household heterogeneity is not built into 
the model.
13   
Several computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been constructed 
to  investigate  regional  implications  of  climate  and  energy  in   the  U.S.  For 
example, the ADAGE model, documented in  Ross (2008), has a  U.S. regional 
module which is usually aggregated to five or six regions.  The MRN -NEEM 
model described in  Tuladhar et  al. (2009) has  nine  U.S. regions.   Both these 
models use a single representative household in each region.  
Rausch et  al. (2009) does  an explicit  CGE analysis of carbon pricing  in  a 
single-period  CGE  model.    That  analysis  considers  a  variety  of  possible 
allocations of the revenue and/or allowances from cap-and-trade system and finds 
that  the  use  of  revenues  affects  the  overall  progressivity  of  the  policy 
substantially.  It also finds that a significant portion of the carbon price is passed 
back to factors of production  – most notably owners of natural resources and 
capital.  This contributes to a greater progressivity of carbon pricing than found in 
literature that assumes full forward shifting.  
 
4. U.S. CAP AND TRADE PROPOSALS: ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION 
Below we carry out distributional analyses of cap and trade policies based on 
alternative  proposals  for  greenhouse  gas  control  legislation  currently  under 
consideration in the U.S.  These are the house-passed American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (H.R. 2454) sponsored by Reps. Waxman and Markey, the Clean 
Energy Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733) a Senate bill similar to H.R. 2454 
and sponsored by Senators Kerry and Boxer, and now replaced by the American 
Power Act (APA) draft bill by Kerry and Lieberman, and the Carbon Limits for 
                                                 
12 The paper also provides a thorough summary of the literature on the incidence impacts of 
environmental taxes. 
13  A recent paper by  Bento et al. (2009) marks an advance in the literature by allowing for 
household heterogeneity over income and location.  That paper considers the impact of increased 
U.S. gasoline taxes taking into account new and used car purchases along with scrappage and 
changes in driving behavior. 13 
 
America’s  Renewal  (CLEAR)  Act,  a  competing  Senate  Bill  sponsored  by 
Senators Cantwell and Collins.  All proposals seek an overall reduction of GHG 
emissions in the U.S. to 83% below 2005 levels by 2050 with intervening targets.  
Cap and trade components of the bills cover most of the economy’s emissions but 
not necessarily all of them, with other measures directed toward uncapped sectors.  
For example, estimates are that Waxman-Markey covers between 85% and 90% 
of emissions with a cap and trade system.  Waxman-Markey has a slightly looser 
target for sectors covered by the cap and trade in 2020 than does Kerry-Boxer, 
issuing allowances at a level 17% below 2005 emissions in 2020, whereas the 
economy-wide goal is a 20% reduction by that date.  Kerry-Lieberman would sell 
as many allowances as needed to refineries at a fixed price but would adjust over 
time to meet quantity targets. In our simulations of the effects of these bills, we 
assume the national goals are met, and we achieve them with a cap and trade 
system that covers all U.S. emissions except for land use CO2 sources (or sinks).  
All of these proposals including banking and limited borrowing provisions and 
hence the time profile of reductions described in the bills are better thought of as 
the time profile of allowance allocation, with actual emissions levels in each year 
determined by how allowances are banked or borrowed (to the extent borrowing 
is allowed).  In our simulations we find that the allocations result in net banking 
with no borrowing.  Of course, in actuality borrowing may occur to the extent that 
unexpected costs make it attractive to bring permits forward in time.   
While the stated national targets are identical across the bills, the Cantwell and 
Collins proposal has no provision for the use of offsets from outside the capped 
sectors to be used in lieu of the cap.  Reductions similar in nature to the offsets 
allowed in the other bills are to be funded from a portion of the auction revenues 
that are subject to future appropriations. The other two proposals allow up to two 
billion  tons  per  year  of  outside  credits  from  a  combination  of  domestic  and 
foreign sources.  In our simulations the domestic credits would need to come from 
a  combination  of  reduced  land  use  emissions  and  increased  land  use  sinks.  
Foreign  credits  would  come  from  qualified  reductions  abroad.    As  shown  in 
Paltsev et al. (2009) if these credits are available at reasonable costs they would 
significantly reduce the CO2 price and expected welfare cost of the legislation.  
Emissions from the capped sectors then are reduced much less than the target 
levels in the bill because available allowances are supplemented with external 
credits.    Our  main  interest  in  this  paper  is  the  consequences  of  alternative 
distribution of allowances, and so we simulate the Cantwell-Collins allocation 
scheme allowing for the same level of outside credits as the other two bills.  Any 
differences are the result of the allowance distribution mechanisms rather than the 
level of the cap.  
The proposals are not always clear as to whether allowances are auctioned by 































Figure 2.  The Allocation of Allowance Value in the Waxman-Markey Bill. 
 
distributed to entities who then can sell them.  For example, designations to States 
could  involve  either  a  portion  of  allowance  revenue  or  direct  allocation  of 
allowances leaving it up to the State to sell them into the allowance market.  For 
our modeling purposes it does not matter whether it is revenue or the allowances 
that are distributed.  We thus focus in our analysis on the allocation of ―allowance  
value‖ in the different proposals to allow for distribution of allowances or the 
revenue from an auction.  
Figure  2  shows  the  allowance  allocation  scheme  as  it  is  proposed  in  the 
Waxman-Markey bill. We do not show graphically the Kerry-Lieberman, Kerry-
Boxer and Cantwell-Collins allowance allocation schemes here. The Cantwell-
Collins bill calls for 75% of allowance revenue to be returned in a lump sum 
manner  and  25%  retained  to  meet  several  objectives  but  without  specifying 
percentages for each. In terms of Figure 2, that bill would be simply two bars 
dividing allowance value among these two purposes. The allocation schemes in 
Kerry-Boxer  and  Kerry-Lieberman  are  similar  to  Waxman-Markey.  The  main 15 
 
difference is in terms of allowances set aside to offset the impact of the bill on the 
deficit.    Waxman-Markey  allocates  at  most  10%  of  the  allowances  for  this 
purpose, in part directly and in part by directing how revenues obtained through 
early auction would be used, whereas Kerry-Boxer allocates a percentage that 
grows to 25%.
15 The allocation of revenue for deficit impacts in Kerry-Lieberman 
is much closer to Waxman-Markey. The increasing share devoted to this purpose 
proportional reduces the allocation to all other purposes .   For example, Kerry-
Boxer is able to allocate less than 50% of allowance value directly to households 
through either the low income energy assistance or the consumer rebate fund —
whereas Waxman-Markey is able to allocate about 65% to households by 2050 
through these two programs. 
Both  Kerry-Boxer  and  Waxman-Markey  have  a  small  strategic  reserve  of 
allowances  and  both  allocate  a  substantial  portion  of  allowances  to  local 
electricity and natural gas distribution companies in early years on the basis that 
these  regulated  entities  will  turn  allowance  value  over  to  ratepayers,  thus 
offsetting some of the impact of higher energy prices.  This turns these LDCs into 
the mechanism for distribution as opposed to a government auction agency as in 
Cantwell-Collins.  The other bills transition to a system closer to Cantwell-Collins 
over time, replacing the LDC distribution with a consumer rebate fund.  Both 
retain a separate allocation to focus specifically on low income energy consumers.   
Both also then distribute allowances to different industries that are expected to be 
particularly affected by the legislation, but these allocations phase out by 2030.  
Use of allowances as an extra incentive for carbon capture and sequestration is 
also identified in both.  A next set of allowances are allocated to fund various 
domestic energy efficiency programs.  The next grouping of allocations is for 
international  mitigation  and  adaptation  and  for  domestic  adaptation  programs.  
Waxman-Markey contains a large set of allowances in later years designated for 
prior year use.  This use possibly reallocates allowances through time, allowing 
the possibility of Federal borrowing if allowance prices rise too much.  Of more 
relevance here is that the bill prescribes about one-half of this allowance value to 
go to the Treasury to offset impacts on the deficit and the other half as a consumer 
rebate.  These amounts are shown in Figure 2 combined with the other provisions 
that direct revenue to the Treasury and to the consumer rebate.  That value is 
allocated  in  the  year  in  which  the  allowances  would  be  originally  issued,  i.e. 
assuming the Federal government does not borrow them or if it does, the income 
is not rebated immediately.  The Kerry-Boxer bill does not have this provision. 
We do not represent the many different programs to which these allowances or 
allowance  value  would  go  and  the  exact  recipients  will  depend  on  program 
                                                 
15 This depends in part on whether future vintage allowances are sold early in the 2014-2020 
period.  If so, the share of allowances allocated to deficit reduction rises to roughly 12 percent of 
total allowances (current allowances and future allowances brought forward). 16 
 
decisions yet to be made.  However, we approximate the impact on regions and 
households of different income levels by distributing the allowance value based 
on data we have within the model, and that approximates what we believe to be 
the  intent  of  the  different  distributions  or  how  they  would  tend  to  work  in 
practice. The distributional instruments we have at our disposal in the USREP 
Model and the correspondence to allocations called out in the bills are given in 
Table 4. For example, we allocate to households  the proposed distribution of 
allowances to LDCs based on emissions and respective electricity and natural gas 
consumption. To determine the regional distribution, we allocate 50% of LDCs 
allowances based on historic sectoral emissions for the electricity and natural gas 
electrictiy sector, respectively. The other half is allocated to regions based on 
household electricity and natural gas consumption.
16 Within a region, allowances 
to  LDCs  are  allocated  based  on  respective  fuel  consumption.  Allocations 
designated for low income households are distributed to households with incomes 
of less than $30,000 per year.   
Distributions to industries other than LDCs go to households based on t heir 
capital earnings on the basis that this value will be reflected in the equity value of 
firms, and so households that own capital, for example, through stock ownership, 
will be the beneficiaries.
17  Allowances distributed for energy efficiency and such 
are distributed by region based on regional energy consumption and then within a 
region  by  energy  consumption  by  household  on  the  basis  that  regions  and 
households that consume more energy have more opportunities to take advantage 
of these programs. Allowances designated for worker assistance are distributed to 
regions based on oil and coal production on the basis that these industries are 
most likely to be affected by unemployment as the country shifts away from fossil 
fuels.  We distribute funds devoted to CCS along with other energy R&D funds. 
Given this mapping of the allocation provisions in the various legislative 
proposals we construct Figure 3 that is similar to Figure 2 but showing instead 
the allocation of allowance value mapped to the instruments we use in USREP.  
The  distribution  instruments  for  all  of  these  uses,  except  Foreign  and 
Government,  direct  revenue  to  households  but  the  particular  instrument 
determines how the allowance value is allocated among households in different  
                                                 
16 Rausch, et al. (2009) consider the efficiency implications of a misperception by households that 
this lump-sum transfer lowers the marginal price of electricity and natural gas. 
17 An output-based rebate (OBR) to energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries may 
result in a greater pass-through of allowance value to end consumers relative to our allocation 
based on capital earnings. How this allowance should be divided up, however, depends on factors 
such as the degree of pass-through in downstream sectors, given that EITE products are often 
intermediate goods, e.g. steel.  Our approach treats all vulnerable industries symmetrically, and we 
allocate  allowances  lump  sum  proportional  to  capital  income.  Our  approach  does  not  capture 
incentive  effects  that  would  arise  if  allowance  value  was  used  to  subsidize  output  in  these 
industries. Such output subsidies would incur additional efficiency costs that we do not capture. 17 
 

















(a)  Targeted Allowance Allocation Scheme                  (b) Per Capita Dividend Scheme  
                          
Figure 3.  The Allocation of Allowance Value according to Model Distribution 
Instruments. 
 
regions and in different income classes.  As modeled, allowance value allocated 
abroad has no value for U.S. households.  In the proposed legislation, most of the 
allowance  value  distribution  is  a  pure  transfer  but  some  of  these  program 
expenditures  are  intended  to  incentivize  energy  savings  and  the  like.  Our 
allocation approach treats all of these program expenditures as pure transfers.
19  
To the extent these programs overcome barriers that are not addressed by the CO2 
price, additional efficiency gains would reduce the welfare costs we estimate.  To 
the extent these programs create double-incentives for particular activities, then 
they are redirecting abatement to activities that are not the most cost effective and 
that would increase the welfare cost we estimate.  The assumption that they are 
pure transfers is therefore a neutral assumption. Furthermore, note that transfers 
of allowance value to households are treated as being non-taxable, with the effect 
                                                 
19 We assume that the 25% of allowances in the Cantwell-Collins bill that go to a dedicated trust to 
fund  climate  mitigation  and  adaptation,  clean  energy  and  efficiency,  and  transition  assistance 
programs, are allocated according to residual shares for similar categories (Energy use, Foreign, 
Government) in the Waxman-Markey bill. We understand that additional legislation  would be 
needed to appropriate this allowance revenue to the purposes identified in the legislation, and 
absent that the revenue would be returned to the Treasury.  18 
 
of increasing how much allowance value must be set aside relative to a scenario 
where such transfers are taxed.  
Allowances allocated to government reduce the need for capital and labor taxes 
to be raised as much to meet the revenue neutrality assumption we impose
20, and 
so affect the distribution to households based on how increases in taxes affect 
different regions and income classes. 
 
5. SCENARIO DESIGN 
We distinguish two sets of scenarios that differ with respect to the underlying 
allowance  allocation  scheme.  Scenarios  labeled  TAAS  represent  a  Targeted 
Allowance Allocation Scheme that is based on the Waxman-Markey or Kerry-
Lieberman  proposal.  The  TAAS_DR  scenario  sets  aside  a  larger  amount  of 
allowances  for the purpose of Deficit Reduction (Deficit Reduction) as  in  the 
allocation rule proposed by Kerry-Boxer. Scenarios labeled PCDS model a simple 
Per Capita Dividend Scheme as is described in the Cantwell-Collins proposal.  
For each of the proposed allocation schemes, we design two scenarios that 
differ with respect to how the revenue neutrality requirement is met.
22 Our base 
case  assumption  is  that  sufficient  allowance  revenue  is  withheld  by  the 
government to cover the deficit impact and the remaining revenue is allocated at 
the percentages shown in Figure 3. An alternative case, denoted  TAX, assumes 
that  only  the  amount  of  allowance  revenue  specifically  designated  for  deficit 
reduction in the bills is allocated to the government.  We then raise capital and 
labor taxes uniformly across regions and income classes (in percentage points) to 
offset revenue losses from carbon pricing.  This is separate from any allowance 
revenue targeted to deficit reduction.  All scenarios assume the medium offset 
case from the analysis carried out in Appendix C of Paltsev et al. (2009) with 
identical  assumptions  about  supply  and  costs  of  domestic  and  international 
offsets. We further assume that offsets have a cost to the economy, and implement 
this  assumption  by  transferring  abroad  the  value  of  allowances  purchases 
internationally. Our assumption is that the average cost of these credits is $5 per 
effective ton of offsets of CO2-e in 2015, rising at 4% per year thereafter.
24  Also  
                                                 
20 See Section 5 for a discussion of our treatment of revenue neutrality. 
22 We fix government spending in the policy scenarios to match government spending under the 
reference scenario.  Since government spending does not enter household utility functions, we did 
not want to confound welfare impacts from change s in the size of government with welfare 
impacts of climate policy.  We discuss the implications of this assumption in section 6.1 below. 
Government spending in the reference scenario is assumed to growth in proportion with aggregate 
income. 
24 The Waxman-Markey bill specifies that 1.25 tons of foreign reductions are required to produce 
1 ton of effective offsets. The $5/ton initial offset price means the actual payment per ton of 
foreign reduction is $4. For all proposals analyzed, we treat offsets costs symmetrically.  19 
 
Table 4.  Correspondence between Proposals Allowance Value Allocations and Distribution Instruments in USREP. 
 
ALLOWANCE RECIPIENTS  MODEL INSTRUMENT 
Mitigating Price Impacts on Consumers   
  All electricity local distribution companies (LDCs)  Lump-sum  transfer  to  consumers.  Allocated  to  regions  based  on  GHG  emissions 
(50%) and based on value of electricity consumption (50%). Within a region, allocated 
to households based on the value of electricity 
  Additional allowances for small electricity LDCs  Lump-sum  transfer  to  consumers.  Allocated  to  regions  based  on  GHG  emissions 
(50%) and based on value of gas consumption (50%). Within a region, allocated to 
households based on the value of gas consumption. 
  Natural gas LDCs  Lump-sum transfer to consumers based on value of gas consumption 
  State  programs  for  home  heating  oil,  propane,  and  kerosene 
consumers 
Lump-sum  transfer  to consumers based  on  value of  oil consumption  (excluding  oil 
consumed for transportation purposes) 
Assistance for Households and Workers   
  Protection for low-income households  Lump-sum transfer to households with annual income less than $30k. 
  Worker assistance and job training  Distributed to regions based on value of energy production (coal, crude oil and refined 
oil). Within a region, distributed across households base on wage income. 
  Per-capita consumer rebate  Lump-sum transfer based on per-capita. 
  Nuclear working training
1  Distributed to regions based on value of nuclear electricity generation. Within a region, 
distributed across households based on wage income. 
Allocations to Vulnerable Industries
2  Lump-sum transfer based on capital income 
Technology Funding
3  Distributed to regions based on energy use (industrial and private). Within a region, 
distributed based on household energy consumption. 
International Funding
4  Transferred abroad. 
Domestic Adaptation  Distributed to government. 
Other Uses   
  Deposited  into  the  Treasury  (to  offset  the  bill's  impact  on  the 
deficit) 
Distributed to government. 
  Grants to state and local agencies for transportation planning and 
transit
1 
Distributed to government. 
  Compensation for "early action" emission reductions prior to cap's 
inception 
Distributed to households on a per capita basis  
  Allowances already auctioned in prior years  46% distributed to households on a per-capita basis, 54% distributed to government.
5 
  Strategic reserve allowances  Distributed to households on a per capita basis. 
Note: 
1This allowance category only applies to the Kerry-Boxer bill. 
2Allocations to vulnerable industries include: Energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries, 
all  petroleum  refiners,  additional  allowances  for  small  refiners,  merchant  coal-fired  electricity  generators,  generators  under  long-term  contracts  without  cost 
recovery, cogeneration facilities in industrial parks. 
3Technology Funding includes: Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) incentives, state renewable energy 
and  efficiency  programs,  state  building  retrofit  programs,  incentives  for  renewable  energy  and  agricultural  emissions  reductions,  clean  vehicle  technology 
incentives, energy innovation hubs,  energy efficiency and renewable energy worker training fund,  advanced energy research, supplemental reductions from 
agriculture, abandoned mine land, and renewable energy. 
4International Funding includes:  International avoided deforestation, international clean technology 
deployment, and international adaptation. 
5We allocate allowances that are already auctioned in prior years to the government and to households according to the 




note  that  since  we  create  more  allowance  revenue  for  the  government  by 
increasing the allowances to account for credits coming from outside the system, 
we assume that the income transferred abroad to account for permit prices is taken 
from the allowance revenue. Finally, our assumptions about the supply of offsets 
imply a 203 bmt cumulative emissions target for 2012-205, which underlies all of 
the scenarios we consider here.  
Our  analysis  also  takes  banking  and  borrowing  into  consideration.  In  the 
Waxman-Markey  bill,  banking  of  allowances  is  unlimited  and  a  two-year 
compliance  period  allows  unlimited  borrowing  from  one  year  ahead  without 
penalty.  Limited borrowing from two to five years ahead is also allowed, but with 
interest. In general, we find no need for aggregate borrowing, and so there is no 
need to implement an explicit restriction on it.  
Our scenarios draw on features of the proposed pieces of legislation described 
above but in no way purport to model them in their entirety.  Our focus is on the 
efficiency and distributional consequences of allowance allocation schemes and 
our scenarios model allowance trading along with their allocation over time.  In 
that regard, we have had to interpret how we believe various allocations would 
work  in  practice  when  the  exact  allocation  approach  has  not  yet  been  fully 
described,  and  would  only  be  completely  determined  by  executive  branch 
agencies responsible for these programs if the legislation were implemented. In 
addition, we do not model other components of the various pieces of legislation 
dealing with other policy measures such as renewable portfolio standards. 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS 
Figure 4 shows the Reference and Policy with offsets emissions for the period 
2012  to  2050.  Projected  Reference  cumulative  emissions  over  the  2012-2050 
period are 298 bmt. In the Policy with offsets case, cumulative emissions are 203 
bmt, a reduction of nearly one-third from Reference. The emissions path shown in 
Figure 4 for the Policy with offsets case is the result from the scenario TAAS.  
Cumulative emissions are identical under all six policy simulations, and the actual 
emissions paths are nearly identical.  Slight differences in the emissions paths 
exist because of different overall welfare costs and distributional effects that can 
lead to a slightly different allocation of abatement over time, but these differences 
are so small that they would be imperceptible if plotted in Figure 4. Emissions in 
the Reference include estimates of the effects of existing energy policies under the 
Energy  Independence  and  Security  Act  and  the  American  Recovery  and 
Reinvestment Act as they are projected to affect greenhouse gas emissions.  Note, 
that  while  the  allowance  allocation  for  2050  is  set  at  83%  below  2005,  our 
projected emissions in 2050 in the Policy with offsets case are only 35% below 
2005 emissions because of the availability of offsets and banking. Before turning 















                       (a) GHG Emissions                (b) CO2 Price 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Carbon Price (Scenario TAAS). 
 
U.S. welfare impacts of the various policies we model.  Figure 5 presents the 
change  in  welfare  relative  to  the  Reference  scenario,  measured  in  equivalent 
variation as a percentage of full income
27, for the various bills.  One key result we 
see is that the  _TAX scenarios lead to higher welfare costs than the scenarios 
where  a  fraction  of  the  allowance  revenue  is  withheld  to  satisfy  revenue 
neutrality.  Considering the TAAS scenario, for example, the welfare cost is 1.38 
percent of full income by 2050 under the lump-sum scenario and 1.60 percent 
under the tax scenario. Similar results hold for TAAS_DR and PCDS.  This occurs 
because the _TAX scenarios create more deadweight loss from capital and labor 
taxation.    Many  economists  have  focused  on  a  double-dividend  effect  where 
allowance revenue is used to lower capital and labor taxes, but here we have the 
reverse effect.  Not enough of the revenue is retained to offset the deficit effects 
of the bill so that capital and labor taxes need to be increased, thereby increasing 
the cost the bill.
28 
Conditional on the treatment of revenue shortfalls, the three  scenarios have 
very  similar  aggregate  costs.    TAAS_DR_TAX  is  somewhat  less  costly  than 
TAAS_TAX because the former scenario reserves more of the allowance to offset 
                                                 
27 Full income is the value of consumption, leisure, and the consumption stream from residential 
capital. 
28 This follows from our particular assumption about how taxes are raised to maintain revenue 
neutrality.  It  is  certainly  possible  that  lump-sum  taxes  could  be  employed  or  some  other 
configuration of tax increases that is less distortionary than the tax increases we model.  Therefore 
one should not conclude that our result is general. 22 
 
the deficit and thus capital and labor taxes do not need to be increased as much. 
The costs of PCDS and PCDS_TAX are slightly lower than the TAAS scenarios.  
The  lower  costs  of  the  PCDS  scenarios  at  first  blush  are  surprising.  These 
scenarios retain less of the allowance value to offset the deficit, and hence in the 
_TAX case it requires somewhat higher increases in capital and labor taxes to 
offset the deficit. The lower costs in PCDS scenarios arise from the distributional 
outcomes as they affect energy expenditures and savings. In particular, TAAS and 
TAAS_DR, through the low income energy assistance programs allocate more of 
the revenue value to poorer households. Lower income households spend a larger 
fraction of their income on energy and they save less.  Thus, the abatement effect 
of pricing carbon is offset to greater extent by an income effect among poorer 
households in the TAAS and TAAS_DR than in the PCDS scenarios. In addition, 
there is less saving and therefore less investment in TAAS and TAAS_DR because 
less is saved for each additional dollar allocated to poorer households.  Note that 
our aggregate welfare estimates are a simple sum of the welfare of each income 
class across all regions.  An aggregate welfare function that weighted the welfare 
of lower income households higher, giving welfare benefit to more progressive 
outcomes  would  change  these  results,  showing  better  results  for  TAAS  and 
TAAS_DR.  How much to value more progressive outcomes is a judgment.  Here 
we  leave  it  to  the  policy  community  to  decide  whether  the  more  progressive 
outcome of TAAS and TAAS_DR is worth the extra welfare cost. 
6.1. Distributional Impacts across Income Groups 
Aggregate  impacts  obscure  differential  effects  across  households.    Ideally  we 
would construct a measure of the lifetime burden of carbon pricing and relate that 
to  a measure of lifetime income.  Our data do not  allow us  to  do that.  Our 
recursive-dynamic model has households of different income groups in each year 
but we have no data that allow us to track the transition of households from one 
income group to another.  Instead we report burden impacts for different income 
groups at different points of time to show how the relative burden shifts over 
time.   
Figure  6  shows  the  burden  for  a  representative  household  in  each  income 
group  for  2015,  2030,  and  2050  for  TAAS  measured  as  equivalent  variation 
divided by full income (including the value of leisure and household capital).  
Positive  values  indicate  that  a  household  benefits  from  the  carbon  policy.  
Households in the two lowest income groups, hhl and hh10, benefit in all periods 
as the return of permit revenue through various mechanisms more than offsets the 
higher cost of goods and services due to carbon pricing and any effects on their 




Figure 5.  Welfare Change for Different GHG Control Proposals (U.S. Average). 
 
income. Households hh15 and hh25 initially benefit but eventually bear net costs, 
hh15 only in the final period.  The effect of allocating an increasing amount of 
allowances on a per-capita basis is particularly strong for the lowest income group 
relative to higher income households since a dollar of additional revenue makes 
up  a  larger  fraction  of  full  income  for  these  households.
29  The five highest 
income  households  bear  net  costs  throughout  the  period  though  the  burden 
through 2030 is less than 1 percent of income for all income groups.  Over time, 
the burden of the policy grows for wealthier households with the burden ranging 
from 1 to roughly 1.5 percent by 2050. 
In all years the cap and trade policy combined with the  TAAS  allocation 
scenarios is sharply progressive over the first five income groups though the  
                                                 
29 Pechman (1985) realized that income data for the low income groups suffered from substantial 
income mismeasurement. Since then, the approach adopted by him and many others is to omit the 
lowest income group from distributional analyses. Given the interest of the policy community for 
impacts  on  low  income  households,  we  decided  to  report  results  for  households  with  annual 
income less than $10k, but we want to point out that in light of likely measurements problems we 
do not have the same degree of confidence in results as we do for other income groups. 
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Table 6.  Annual  Cost per Household by Income Group (Scenario TAAS). 
  hhl  hh10  hh15  hh25  hh30  hh50  hh75  hh100  hh150  Average 
2015  -614  -472  -467  -426  36  261  328  344  401  87 
2020  -563  -412  -418  -349  230  386  532  501  532  221 
2025  -450  -248  -207  -64  631  920  1109  1098  1237  646 
2030  -603  -240  -168  63  950  1420  1589  1650  2031  939 
2035  -763  -304  -190  110  1170  1842  2050  2192  2758  1195 
2040  -851  -307  -156  203  1397  2222  2456  2636  3304  1451 
2045  -827  -216  -13  411  1658  2661  2916  3141  3918  1774 
2050  -778  -109  129  594  1853  2974  3246  3482  4278  2008 
NPV  
Average
a  -291  -150  -119  -33  331  538  614  642  780  347 
Note: Table reports annual dollar costs per household by income group in various years.  All dollar 
amounts are in 2006 dollars. 
a Net Present Value (NPV) average of welfare costs discounted to 
2010 at 4% per annum.  
 
burden for each income group, except that of the lowest, grows over time as the 
policy begins to impose larger reductions in emissions.  The difference in burdens 
over the lowest five income groups grows over time as does the spread between 
the burden for the lowest income group relative to the highest income group. The 
policy is essentially neutral over the top income groups in all periods.  As we will 
show below over time sources side effects become more important in shaping the 
distributional outcomes than do uses side effects. 
Table  6 reports the annual  cost  in  dollar terms for different  households  in 
different years.  On average the per-household costs are relatively modest in the 
early years of the program.  While the costs appear large by 2050, it is important 
to keep in mind that incomes are growing so that these costs are still modest 
relative  to  household  income.  The  average  over  time  is  the  net  present  value 
(NPV) average.  Note that Waxman-Markey allows considerable borrowing of 
allowances from the future by the Federal government if necessary to moderate 
CO2 prices in the early years. If these were auctioned in earlier years then the 
allowance  revenue  would  accrue  to  the  government  earlier  and  in  principle  it 
could be used earlier.  We have assumed the revenue is only available when the 
allowances were originally scheduled to be auctioned.  If borrowing occurred and 




Figure 6.  Welfare Change by Income Group, U.S. Average (Scenario TAAS). 
    
 
 




Figure 8.  Welfare Change by Income Group, U.S. Average (Scenario TAAS_TAX). 
 
 




Table 7.  Allocation Of Annual Allowance Value And Tax Revenue (Scenario TAAS). 
Allowance Values and Tax Revenue  Allocation of Allowance Value  
(Net of Tax Revenue Loss) 











Households  Government  Transferred 
abroad 
2015  160.6  50.3  31.3  99.8  2.9  7.6 
2020  182.9  52.2  28.5  113.0  2.9  9.0 
2025  212.7  72.3  34.0  115.9  5.9  12.4 
2030  254.1  73.1  28.8  131.5  30.2  19.3 
2035  309.5  91.0  29.4  157.3  40.0  21.2 
2040  374.0  124.4  33.3  182.4  43.0  24.2 
2045  434.4  182.8  42.1  195.4  31.8  24.4 
2050  494.7  248.8  50.3  203.0  19.1  23.9 
Note: Unless otherwise stated, all amounts are in billions of dollars. 
a Change relative to the baseline. 
 
deficit impacts and as a lump sum rebate to consumers - that could blunt some of 
the progressivity in earlier years. 
Costs and distributional impacts for TAAS_DR are very similar to TAAS and so 
we  do  not  report  them  here.    Rather  we  turn  to  the  PCDS.  Like  TAAS  and 
TAAS_DR, PCDS has modest to negative burdens initially with burdens rising 
over time.   In comparison to the former bills the burden spreads across income 
groups in any given year are smaller. Lower income households benefit in the 
early years but not as much as in TAAS and TAAS_DR. This is reflected in the 
flatter distributional curves for different years in Figure 7.  By 2050 the PCDS 
scenario and the TAAS scenario have more similar distributional effects because 
by that time the allocation formula in TAAS_DR has become similar to that of the 
PCDS, with 65 percent of revenue distributed on per capita basis.  The remaining 
difference is the continued allocation to low income consumers. 
Distributional outcomes are altered when the full value of allowances is allocated 
as specified in the bills and revenue losses in the federal budget are instead made 
up by raising personal income tax rates.  In general, the distributional burden 
across household groups is more progressive in the _TAX cases.  Consider the 
burden snapshots for three different years as shown in Figure 8 for TAAS_TAX.   
Lower-income households fare better under this  approach with  benefits to  the 
lowest income group rising from 1 to about 1.5 percent of full income in 2015 
while the highest income groups are only slightly affected.  Lower income groups 
continue to do better – and in some cases are better off – when tax rates are raised 
to recoup lost tax revenues than when allowance value is withheld.  In general  28 
 
Table 8.  Increase In Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate for Revenue Neutrality. 
Year  TAAS_TAX  TAAS_DR_TAX  PCDS_TAX 
2015  0.52  0.34  0.48 
2020  0.56  0.35  0.43 
2025  0.73  0.50  0.58 
2030  0.58  0.26  0.55 
2035  0.63  0.31  0.65 
2040  0.80  0.35  0.83 
2045  1.13  0.58  1.12 
2050  1.50  0.79  1.48 
Note: Tax rate increase in percentage points. 
 
they remain better off through 2050 because of the tax changes.  By raising taxes 
to offset the deficit, more revenue remains available to be distributed, and the 
increase  in  transfers  to  lower-income  groups  more  than  offsets  increases  in 
taxation  to  these  households.  A  similar  result  holds  for  the  PCDS  allocation 
proposal (see Figure 9). 
The  different  treatments  of  revenue  neutrality  illustrates  a  classic  equity-
efficiency  trade-off,  where  the  withholding  of  allowances  to  preserve  revenue 
neutrality yields higher efficiency but less progressive outcomes than if taxes are 
raised to maintain revenue neutrality in the government budget.   
The impact of climate policy on government tax revenues is significant and 
helps  explain  why  the  different  approaches  to  maintaining  revenue  neutrality 
matter.  Table 7 provides a comparison of allowance values and losses in tax 
revenue arising from cap-and-trade policy.  The initial loss of tax revenue due to 
higher costs for firms and reduced economic activity is about 30 percent of the 
value of allowances.  The percentage begins rising in 2040 and by 2050, the loss 
in tax revenue rises to one-half.  The high tax revenue loss is in part an artifact of 
the assumption in the model that fixes the path of government spending to match 
that of the reference (no policy) scenario.  (We refer to this as absolute revenue 
neutrality.)  Lower GDP growth increases the size of government relative to GDP 
and magnifies the loss in tax revenue relative to allowance value.  We make this 
assumption because the government sector in USREP does not produce explicit 
public goods that have any welfare value.  By keeping revenue neutral changes in 
government we do not release or consume more resources that otherwise would 
be available to private sector.   
An alternative approach would be to fix the ratio of government spending to 
GDP in the policy scenarios.  To assess the distributional implications of this 
would then require production of a public good and an estimate of how that public 








































Figure 11.  Welfare Change by Region (Scenario TAAS). 
 
when  government  spending  was  increased  or  decreased  we  would  have  an 
estimate of how that was affecting distribution compared with how distribution 
was  affected  by  changes  in  resources  available  to  the  private  sector.    If  the 30 
 
government were kept at the same size in relative rather than absolute terms, the 
revenue needed to offset impacts on the deficit would not increase and would 
generally be at about the percentage we see in 2015.  The difference would then 
be  additional  allowance  value  that  could  be  used  for  distributional  or  other 
purposes.   
We note that the Congressional Budget Office scores bills on their impact on 
the  deficit,  using  a  standard  procedure  for  all  legislation  that  is  accepted  by 
Congress.  The CBO methodology is described in Congressional Budget Office 
(2009).    That  approach  will  not  be  consistent  with  our  approach  that 
endogenously calculates the deficit, and the revenue needed to close the deficit.  
The two approaches do lead to reasonably close estimates of the allowance value 
that must be set aside in early years (25 percent for CBO and 30 percent in this 
analysis) before the results diverge due to the different modeling approach taken 
by CBO from the approach taken here. 
With  absolute  revenue  neutrality,  the  need  to  make  up  substantial  revenue 
losses leads to fairly large increases in marginal personal income tax rates under 
the tax-based make-up (see Table 8).  The TAAS_DR_TAX increases are much 
less  than  the  other  two  scenarios  because  more  of  the  revenue  is  explicitly 
allocated to deficit effects of the proposal. This just illustrates one way to make 
up revenue losses.  Other approaches could be undertaken that could enhance 
efficiency or equity goals.
30 
Summing up, we find that the TAAS and TAAS_DR scenarios on the one hand 
and the PCDS scenarios on the other have quite different distributional impacts 
across  households,  especially  in  the  early  years  of  the  program.    In  addition, 
policy decisions on how to close the budget deficit arising from decreased tax 
collections have both efficiency and distributional implications.   
Using higher personal income taxes to close the deficit incurs an efficiency 
cost  but  increases  the  progressivity  of  the  programs  because  more  of  the 
allowance revenue is available for distribution to households.  We next turn to 
regional impacts. 
6.2. Distributional Impacts across Regions 
Policy makers have also expressed concern over the regional impacts of climate 
policy. In this section we explore how regional impacts change over time for the 
allocation scenarios we have designed. Figure 10 shows that the greenhouse gas 
emission reductions differ substantially among regions.  Results are shown for the 
TAAS  scenario.    These  differences  reflect  different  shares  of  emissions  from 
different sectors (electricity, transportation, industry) and different  
 
                                                 



















Figure 12.  Welfare Change by Region (Scenario PCDS). 
 
electric generation technologies (nuclear, hydro, coal, natural gas).  The energy 
and emissions intensive regions (MOUNT, SEAST, SCENT, NCENT) show the 
largest reductions. States in the Mountain, Southeast, Northeast and North Central 
regions all experience reductions in GHG emissions relative to the business as 
usual scenario in excess of 50 percent by 2050. 
Figure 11 shows the welfare impact of the TAAS scenario for each region. 
Initially California, Texas, Florida and states in the South Central, Pacific, and 
New England regions gain from the policy while other states suffer losses.  By 
2050 all states are bearing costs, ranging from about one-half of one percent (New 
England) to about one and three-quarters percent. 
Welfare impacts  for Alaska are  not  shown in  Figure 12 to  better visualize 
relative welfare impacts for other regions.  Under the TAAS scenario Alaska’s 
welfare effects are as follows: 2015: -0.42%; 2020: -1.15%; 2025: -2.26%; 2030: 
-2.57%; 2040: -3.52%; 2050: -5.27%. The substantial welfare impacts for Alaska 
can be attributed to the fact that Alaska exhibits by far the highest energy intensity 
among all regions and is a large energy producing state with a small population 
(see Figure 14). In earlier years of the policy, welfare effects are relatively modest 
compared to, e.g., 2030 and 2050. Alaska actually receives by far the highest 
allowance revenue per household among all regions under the TAAS scheme since 
many of the allowances are allocated on the basis of either energy consumption or 
production, but this is far from sufficient to offset the large costs the economy 
bears. As we note below, over time the allowance allocation effect becomes less 
important  in  determining  overall  policy  costs,  and  relative  regional  welfare 32 
 
differences are increasingly shaped by energy characteristics and income sources. 
This explains why welfare effects for Alaska become more negative over time 
both relative to earlier periods of the policy and in comparison to other regions.  
The  Alaska  case  is  an  interesting  one  in  that  it  is  a  small  state  in  terms  of 
population and GDP with relatively unique energy use and production attributes.  
Our other regions, by aggregating more states, tend to average out so that there is 
less disparity.  The Alaska results are illustrative of within region effects that we 
do not capture because of our aggregation. 
Regional  impacts  under  PCDS  are  less  balanced  initially  (Figure  12).  The 
standard deviation of welfare impacts under PCDS is slightly larger (0.11) than 
under the TAAS scenario (0.09). Recall that PCDS deliberately takes a per-capita 
approach premised on the view that regional disparities do not matter, while TAAS 
includes  a  number  of  provisions  (such  as  LDC  allocations)  that  are  explicitly 
intended to address regional disparities. While the regional dispersion of welfare 
impacts is slightly larger under PCDS, one interesting result of this analysis is that 
the much simpler per-capita based approach is almost as effective in achieving a 
balanced  regional  outcome  as  the  targeted  allocation  scheme.    By  2050,  the 
impacts under PCDS are quite similar to those under TAAS.  Differential regional 
impacts due to differences in allowance allocation schemes dissipate over time. 
Section 7.1 provides a discussion of this effect.    
Impacts under TAAS_DR are very similar to those under TAAS and are not 
reported here. Figure 15 also shows that the relative impacts across regions are 
fairly stable over the policy period under the PCDS allocation. South Central, 
North Central and Northeast states bear a larger impact of the policy though the 
maximum difference across the period is less than two percentage points.
31 
We do not show here the   _TAX  scenarios  because  the  results  are  broadly 
similar to the scenarios where a fraction of the allowance value is withheld to 
satisfy revenue neutrality.  The main differences are that the overall welfare costs 
are larger for the U.S. as whole and thus regional losses tend to be somewhat 
larger.    In  terms  of  distribution,  the  _TAX  cases  tend  to  favor  lower  income 
regions (South and middle of the country) at the expense of higher income regions 
(mainly the east and west coasts) because higher income regions pay more taxes.   
Summing  up  the  regional  results,  all  allocation  scenarios  lead  to  modest 
differential  impacts  across  most  regions.    The  TAAS  and  TAAS_DR  proposals 
show greater gains to several regions in the initial years of the policy and higher 
costs to other regions than do the PCDS scenarios.  One of the political economy 
                                                 
31 Welfare impacts for Alaska under the PCDS scenario are as follows: 2015: -0.60%; 2020: -
1.10%; 2025: -2.31%; 2030: -3.25%; 2040: -4.61%; 2050: -5.95%. Note that under the PCDS 
allocation scheme Alaska receives less allowance revenue as compared to the TAAS case. This 
lowers savings and investment, and hence brings about even larger welfare losses in later periods 
of the policy as for the TAAS scenario. 33 
 
realities of climate change is that the East and West Coast regions have pushed 
harder for climate legislation while the middle of the country and much of south 
has resisted such legislation.  With high energy intensity in these regions and the 
significant presence of fossil industry one might expect greater economic impacts 
of GHG mitigation legislation in these regions.  The Cantwell-Collins bill has not 
been subject to as much debate and negotiation as the other two bills, and has 
been able to retain a simple allocation formula.  The much richer set of allocation 
mechanisms  in  Markey-Waxman  and  Kerry-Boxer  are  likely  the  result  of 
negotiation among representatives of these regions.  To the extent our analysis 
captures  the  regional  distributional  intent  of  these  bills  it  suggests  that  the 
allocation formula are not completely effective in evening out regional effects.  
Some states like Texas and those in the South Central region that might have been 
expected to suffer higher costs have those costs blunted significantly and actually 
come out ahead in early years.  Other regions such as the Mountain and North 
Central states remain the biggest losers in early years.  Over time the allocation 
mechanisms  evolve,  and  regional  impacts  are  driven  more  directly  by  other 
factors. 
 
7. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE BURDEN RESULTS 
In a CGE model it is difficult to attribute differences in results by region and 
income class to specific causes because the possible sources of differences are 
many and they interact in complex ways.  This section provides an analysis of the 
results to provide greater insight into why we see differences in effects.   
7.1. The Importance of the Allowance Allocation Effect over Time 
In order to isolate the impact of the allowance allocation on welfare, we run a 
scenario assuming the allowance value in a given period is not recycled while 
allowances in preceding periods are allocated according to the scheme described 
in the TAAS scenario.   
  Note  that  welfare  costs  will  be  higher  in  this  case  because  the  unrecycled 
revenue increases government expenditure which as described earlier does not, as 
modeled, enter household utility functions.  The intent here is to use this exercise 
to  isolate  the  effects  of  higher  energy  costs  caused  by  pricing  from  those 
distributional impacts that result from the allowance allocation.  Figure 13 shows 
regional welfare impacts  under this  ―no-recycling‖ case. As  expected,  welfare 
costs  for  each  region  and  each  period  are  higher  as  compared  with  the 
corresponding scenario that assumes revenue allocation (compare with Figure 14). 
For  2015,  the  distribution  of  regional  costs  is  due  to  differences  in  regional 
abatement costs.  In later years, the results are driven by abatement costs for that 






































Figure 14.  Regional Energy Intensity over Time (Scenario TAAS). 
 
Gross Regional Product and savings and investment. We see from Figure 16 that 
the pattern of regional welfare costs corresponds closely to differences in regional 
energy intensity (energy consumption per dollar of GDP). Figure 14 shows an 
index of energy intensity by region over time (normalized to the current period 35 
 
U.S.  value).  The  patterns  of  regional  welfare  impacts  and  relative  energy 
intensities largely coincide, and are stable over time.    
  Comparing Figure 14 with Figure 12 now provides a way of disentangling the 
effect of the current period allowance allocation on welfare. The key result is that 
the allocation effect becomes less important over time, and that regional welfare 
impacts are eventually driven more by differences in the energy intensity. One 
reason  for  this  result  is  that  over  time  there  is  less  allowance  value  to  be 
distributed relative to the rising CO2 price as the carbon policy becomes tighter. 
The number of allowances decreases over time and, in addition to that, the erosion 
of the tax base is steadily increasing which means that more of the allowance 
value has to be retained to maintain revenue-neutrality. This effect explains why 
initially in periods 2015-2025 the allocation of allowances has a strong effect on 
regional welfare impacts of the policy.  As noted, regional effects of TAAS bear 
little  relationship  to  factors  like  energy  intensity  and  energy  production  that 
should factor into the cost of the policy.  Some of the regions that display relative 
high energy intensity are actually overcompensated in 2015 and 2020 (viz. the 
South Central and North Central region, and Texas). The results suggest that any 
implemented allocation scheme will prove to be less effective over time in muting 
the regional variation in welfare impacts.   
7.2. Sources vs. Uses Side Impacts of Carbon Pricing  
A well-established observation is that carbon pricing incorporates a regressive 
element  because  lower  income  households  spend  a  higher  proportion  of  their 
income on energy.  Most estimates of the distributional impact of carbon and 
energy pricing focus on this ―cost-push analysis‖ element of carbon pricing by 
using an Input-Output framework to trace price increases through a make-and-use 
matrix to evaluate the policy cost on different households based on expenditure 
shares (e.g., Dinan and Rogers (2002), Parry (2004), Burtraw et al. (2009) and 
Hassett et al. (2009)). Such an approach neglects behavioral responses to relative 
price changes and does not take into account sources side effects.
32 Rausch et al. 
(2009) found that even in a static model the sources side effects were important in 
determining  the  distributional  effects  of  carbon  pricing.  Here  we  repeat  their 
counterfactual analysis in our recursive dynamic simulation. 
  Figure 15 provides welfare impacts across income groups for three scenarios 
designed  to  disentangle  the  contribution  of  sources  and  uses  side  effects  on 
welfare across the income distribution. The logic of our counterfactual analysis is 
as follows. If households in different income groups are characterized by identical 
income shares i.e., have equal ratios of capital, labor, and transfer income, then a 
                                                 
32 Sources side effects refer to burden impacts arising from changes in relative factor prices, while 
uses  side  effects  refer  to  burden  impacts  arising  from  change  in  relative  product  prices.  This 
terminology goes back to Musgrave (1957). 36 
 
change in relative factor prices affects all households equally. This counterfactual 
analysis  isolates  the  distributional  impacts  of  the  uses  of  income  effects  of  a 
policy.  If households are assumed to have identical expenditure shares for all 
goods and services, a change in relative product prices produces an equal impact 
on  consumers  in  different  income  classes.    In  that  case,  we  isolate  the 
distributional  impacts  of  the  sources  of  income  effects  of  a  policy.    Any 
differential burden impacts of a policy across households from the counterfactual 
case  that  eliminates  differences  among  households  in  how  they  spend  their 
income are then determined by sources of income effects.  Results that eliminate 
differences in income sources, allows us to focus on how uses side factors shape 
the relative burden of carbon pricing. 
The two counterfactual cases do not eliminate these drivers of incidence but by 
eliminating household heterogeneity they suppress differential impacts across the 
income  distribution.    Harberger  (1962)  uses  a  similar  analysis  to  identify  the 
incidence of a corporate income tax. Note that as we measure the real burden, i.e., 
the change in equivalent variation, our incidence calculation is independent from 
the choice of numéraire.  
  Panel a shows results for 2015, panel b for 2030 and panel c for 2050.  In each 
panel results for three cases are shown.  The line labeled ―carbon pricing burden‖ 
shows the welfare effect that combines income and expenditure heterogeneity.  
This is the welfare effect, without any recycling, given observed income sources 
and  expenditures  shares  as  they  vary  among  households.    The  line  labeled 
―identical income shares‖ eliminates heterogeneity of income sources to isolate 
the uses side effect of the policy.  The line labeled ―identical expenditure shares‖ 
eliminates  expenditure  heterogeneity  to  isolate  the  sources  side  effect.    A 
downward slope indicates a progressive result and an upward slope a regressive 
result.  We  also  show  the  observed  burden  policy  impacts  labeled  as  ―carbon 
pricing  burden‖.    This  shows  the  differential  burden  impacts  resulting  from 
heterogeneity in both the sources and uses of income. 
  To eliminate the muddying effect of allowance allocation we assume that the 
carbon revenue is not recycled to households.
34   Non-recycled revenue increases 
government spending on goods and services which, by assumption, is not utility 
enhancing.  As a result, the costs to households are much larger because the 
allowance revenue is not available to them but we still see the striking result that 
carbon pricing is modestly progressive initially and, for income groups above the 
two lowest becomes essentially neutral by 2030.  For the  counterfactual analysis 
we hold government transfers to households constant at the no policy level.     
 
 
                                                 
34 We also looked at a scenario in which we assume that additional government revenue is spent 
according to private sector consumption. We find that this has second-order effects only. 37 
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Figure 15. Relative Sources vs. Uses Side Impacts across Income Distribution. 
 
The  uses  side  impacts  are  sharply  regressive  in  all  years  in  accord  with 
previous  analyses  that  focus  on  expenditure  side  burdens  only.    Sources  side 
impacts,  on  the  other  hand,  are  modestly  progressive  in  2015  and  essentially 
proportional in the other years. In all years, combined effects in the line ―carbon 
pricing burden‖ track closely the line ―identical expenditure shares‖. This sug-
gests  that  relative  welfare  impacts  across  the  income  distribution  are  largely 
driven by sources side effects. 
  Table 8 reports sources of income by income class for the base year, and helps 
to explain why sources side effects are modestly progressive especially at low 
income  levels.  The  relative  income  burden  of  carbon  pricing  depends  on  the 
change in relative factors prices and on differences in the ratio for the sources of  
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Table 8.  Source of Income by Annual Income Class in USREP Model. 














Transfer /  
(Capital+Labor) 
ratio 
Hhl  12.8%  6.5%  80.8%  0.5  4.2 
hh10  28.6%  9.8%  61.6%  0.3  1.6 
hh15  43.0%  18.2%  38.8%  0.4  0.6 
hh25  48.3%  22.3%  29.5%  0.5  0.4 
hh30  55.3%  24.7%  20.0%  0.4  0.3 
hh50  60.4%  35.4%  4.2%  0.6  0.0 
hh75  62.0%  37.5%  0.5%  0.6  0.0 
hh10
0 
59.4%  42.3%  -1.7%  0.7  0.0 
hh15
0 
57.6%  45.7%  -3.3%  0.8  0.0 
Note:  Based  on  IMPLAN  data  (Minnesota  IMPLAN  Group,  2008).  Household  transfers  include 
social  security,  state  welfare  payments,  unemployment  compensation,  veterans’  benefits,  food 
stamps, supplemental security income, direct relief, earned income credit. Note that transfers are 
net of household transfer payments to the rest-of-world (including cash transfers as well as goods 
to the rest-of-world). 
 
income for households. We find that the capital rental rate increases over time 
relative  to  the  price  for  labor.  As  the  capital-labor  ratio  slightly  increases  in 
income, just looking at the relative income burden from changes in capital and 
labor income would imply that the uses side is slightly regressive. This finding is 
in  line  with  Fullerton  and  Heutel  (2010)  who  find  that  the  capital  and  labor 
income for the lowest income households falls proportionally more than average. 
What makes the source-side incidence modestly progressive to proportional is the 
fact that low income households derive a large fraction of income from transfers 
relative to low income households, and we hold transfers constant relative to the 
no policy baseline. Transfer income thus insulates households from changes in 
capital  and  labor  income.  This  effect  is  strongest  for  the  two  lowest  income 
households where transfers account for about 80 and 60 percent of income as 
shown in Table 8.
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Figure 15 also suggests that especially in a dynamic setting, the  sources side 
effect is more important in determining the  welfare impact than is the  uses side 
effect for a given income class. The intuition for this result seems fairly obvious—
over time the impacts of an ongoing mitigation policy cumulate through effects on 
overall  economic  growth  and  are  reflected  in  general  wage  rates  and  capital 
                                                 
36 The sensitivity of distributional impacts of policies to the treatment of government transfers has 
been found in other work.  Browning and Johnson (1979), for example, find that holding transfers 
fixed in real terms sharply increases the progressivity of the U.S. tax system.  39 
 
returns.  The  annual  abatement  costs  become  an  ever  smaller  share  of  the 
economic  burden  of  the  policy,  and  so  are  less  important  in  determining  the 
overall  impacts.  Furthermore,  because  the  fraction  of  income  derived  from 
transfers increases over time, we find that the progressivity of the sources-side 
effect also slightly increases for the five lowest income groups.      
Overall,  this  analysis  demonstrates  that  it  can  be  misleading  to  base  the 
distributional  analysis  on  uses  side  factors  only.  The  virtue  of  our  general 
equilibrium  framework  is  the  ability  to  capture  both  expenditure  and  income 
effects in a comprehensive manner.  
 
8. SUMMARY 
There  has  been  much  attention  on  the  overall  cost  and  efficiency  of  current 
legislative proposals for addressing climate change in the U.S.   In this paper we 
focus on the distributional effects of the policies taking account of both the higher 
energy costs that carbon pricing implies and the distribution of allowance value 
described in the bills.  Secondarily we are also interested in any efficiency effects 
of the allowance allocation approaches in the different bills.  To focus on the 
effect  of  allowance  allocation,  we  used  approximations  of  the  allowance 
allocation features of current proposals, but represented here as a comparable, 
comprehensive cap on all emissions in the U.S. with the same level of external 
credits allowed across all allocation scenarios.  We, therefore, did not represent 
other  features  of  the  bills  many  of  which  may  have  strong  efficiency  and 
distributional consequences.  While we try to adhere to the text of the various 
pieces of legislation as closely as possible when allocating allowance value, we 
note that we had to rely on our own interpretation of legislative intent in places 
where allocation mechanisms were not completely defined in the bills.  While the 
scenarios are motivated by the various proposed pieces of legislation, none of the 
scenarios should be interpreted as an analysis of the complete legislation.  
Focusing on efficiency  first,  we find that retaining  more of the revenue to 
offset the deficit impacts of the legislation, as does the Kerry Boxer bill, improves 
the efficiency of mitigation  policy because  labor and capital  taxes  need to  be 
raised less to maintain revenue neutrality.  Economic efficiency is improved if all 
deficit impacts are offset with revenue retained from the allowance auction.  The 
trade-off  is  that  it  would  leave  less  revenue  to  affect  desired  distributional 
outcomes.  
We also find that the scenarios designed to approximate the Cantwell-Collins 
allocation proposal to be less costly than those we used to approximate the other 
bills. We trace this result to the fact that the Cantwell-Collins allocation proposal 
distributes less of the allowance value to poor households.  In the other allocation 
schemes, more money for poorer households produces a greater income effect on 40 
 
energy demand, and as a result abatement is more costly.  Poorer households also 
save less, and so more allowance value going to poor households leads to less 
savings and investment.  Economists have widely acknowledged that there is an 
equity-efficiency tradeoff between schemes with lump-sum distribution and those 
that would cut labor and capital taxes, reducing the distortions they create. Here 
we find a more subtle equity-efficiency tradeoff, where even under lump sum 
distribution of revenue there is an efficiency gain to distributing value to wealthier 
households because less is spent on energy and more of the allowance value ends 
up as savings and investment.   
  Our  analysis  of  distribution  by  income  class  and  region  show  that  the 
Waxman-Markey  and  Kerry-Boxer  (or  Kerry-Lieberman)  allocation  schemes 
address  the  distributional  impacts  of  the  policy  by  redistributing  more  of  the 
allowance value to poorer households and to central and southern regions of the 
U.S. in the early years of the policy, shifting allowance value away from wealthier 
households and the coasts.  In fact the bills redistribute to such a degree that they 
tend to result in net economic benefits for the poorest households and for some 
regions of the country such as the South Central states, Texas, and Florida that 
would generally be expected to bear the highest costs.  The very simple per capita 
allocation scheme of Cantwell-Collins tends to be more distributionally neutral by 
income class but produces slightly less balanced outcome by region.  Over time 
the distribution schemes matter less.  In part this is because over time all these 
bills  convert  to  a  consumer  rebate  and  so  are  more  like  the  Cantwell-Collins 
allocation approach.  However, over time more of the annual cost of the policy is 
the  result  of  economic  growth  effects—reductions  in  past  Gross  Regional 
Product, savings, and investment.  The annual abatement costs become a smaller 
share of the total costs, and the available revenue to alter distributional effects 
shrinks relative to this increasing cost.
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An important finding of this paper is that  sources side  effects  of carbon 
mitigation  proposals  dominate  the  uses  side  effect  in  terms  of  determining 
distribution outcomes.  In the near term, the distributional consequences of the 
carbon pricing can be significantly affected by the distribution of allowance value. 
Over the longer term,  however, the overall growth effects are more important 
determinants of distribution and the revenue available from the allowance auction 
may not be sufficient to have much effect in changing distributional outcomes.   
This point is reinforced by the finding that carbon pricing by itself , i.e.,  when 
carbon revenues are not recycled back to households ,  is  neutral  to modestly 
progressive. This follows from the dominance of sources over uses side impacts 
of the policy and stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has focused only 
                                                 
37  As noted above, the share of allowances that must be held back for revenue neutrality in the out 
years falls if government spending as a share of GDP is held fixed.  A priori it is not obvious 
which assumption on government spending is more realistic. 41 
 
on  the  uses  side.  We  find  sources  side  effects  to  be  modestly  progressive  to 
proportional because low income households derive a relatively large fraction of 
their income from transfers which insulates them from changes in  capital and 
labor income.  
We  emphasize  that  our  scenarios  focused  solely  on  the  distributional 
implications due to carbon pricing and the allocation of allowance revenue, and 
that  we  did  not  attempt  to  model  each  bill  in  its  entirety.  More  precise 
representation of the many programs described in these bills could give different 
outcomes and there is inevitable uncertainty in economic forecasts of this type. 
We also must admit significant limitations in our ability to forecast relative effects 
on regions over the longer term. Climate policy will dramatically change energy 
technologies  and regions  that aggressively develop  these industries and attract 
investment  could  fare  better  even  if  they  currently  are  heavily  fossil  energy 
dependent. However, such regions must overcome the initially higher costs of 
their fossil energy dependence. 
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